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"How often have I said to you," Sherlock Holmes admonishes Dr. Watson, 
"that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however 
improbable, must be the truth" (Doyle, 111). Reading Murray Murphey, for this 
obtuse Watson, is Sure a Lockean experience. He confirms my belief that "there 
is a real world of which true knowledge is possible" (Murphey, x). I am convinced 
also that relativism and narrativism are something less than true, that "the primary 
task in the study of any society is the delineation of the culture and the 
environment" (Murphey, 280), and that past cultures and environments can be 
causally explained. I happily leave to others the task of critiquing Murray's 
arguments with Quine, Wittgenstein, and White; my task is to consider how 
Murray helps historians find truth. 
A crucial tenet of Murray's system is the important role he gives to theory, 
which creates the reality of the past by positing reality as explanations of our 
experience with "real" objects in the present (Murphey, 263). The necessity of 
evidence in the form of documents and artifacts is what makes the work of the 
historian so much like that of the detective. Just as good detectives need to believe 
in truth in order to believe injustice, historians should believe in truth in order to 
0026-3079/95/3702-141 $ 1.50/0 141 
believe in, well, history. History without truth is simply Disney. As defined by 
Murray, history is not what happened in the past, nor what we write about it, but 
"our knowledge of what happened in the past" (Murphey, 264). As I understand 
his argument, unless we believe that our knowledge of the past can be true, 
however incomplete, it can't be history. 
Despite the seeming circularity of the argument, I think it is unassailable once 
you accept that we can have true knowledge of the present. There is another 
problem, however, one that has opened the door to the nattering nabobs of 
narrativism and the raving rajahs of relativism, to borrow a phrase, and that is that 
it's impossible to write about history without using language, which, Murray is 
quick to point out, is posterior to and poorer than thought (Murphey, 1). Because 
our knowledge of the past must be put into words that are subject to multiple 
interpretations, we introduce another layer of hermeneutics. If, as in the case of 
the controversy over the proposed exhibition on the Atomic bomb and the end of 
World War II at the Smithsonian's National Air & Space Museum, the presenta-
tion of historical knowledge includes objects as well as text, the possibilities for 
misunderstanding are compounded. 
Although Murray gives artifactual data the role of offsetting biases in 
documentary evidence of the past and urges the creation of theories that can 
integrate a wide range of data types, the difficulties involved in recontextualizing 
objects that have been made numinous through association with some widely 
admired act, or simply by their inclusion in a museum collection, may be 
insurmountable. History for many people is closer to religion than to science and 
they see no reason to substitute empiricism for faith in their experience of the past. 
Like science, history based on the best theory may have predictive value, but, 
unlike science, it offers little in the way of control over nature. Rather, history 
shows that faith in technological solutions to environmental problems is often 
misplaced. Which brings me to the point where I want to try to supplement 
Murray's argument for equating truth with our best confirmed theories. 
For the past decade I have been struggling to write a history that would 
delineate both the cultural and environmental causes of our current complex and 
paradoxical attitudes toward snow and, by extension, nature. As part of this 
process I have read many of those who profess to be environmental historians. 
The best of them (e.g., Cronon, 1993) reject the currently fashionable notion that 
since nature is a social construction it is impossible to know or manage any 
ecosystem. Environmental historians argue, as Murray does, that while our 
knowledge may be incomplete, it has steadily improved, and that unless we 
assume the active presence of nature in human affairs, our histories, our theories 
about the past, will not be true. The necessity of treating both nature and culture 
as real and knowable is especially crucial in environmental history. 
As soon as someone learned that I was working on attitudes toward snow, 
they inevitably asked if Eskimos have 12, or 40, or 100, or x number of words for 
snow. Thanks to a colleague who called my attention to the work of Laura Martin, 
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I am reasonably certain that the answer to those questions is, no, because Eskimos 
have only two distinct "roots" that refer to snow. Nevertheless, because Eskimo 
words "are the products of an extremely synthetic morphology in which all word 
building is accomplished by multiple suffixation . . . the number of 'words' for 
snow is literally incalculable" (Martin 1986,419). The work of another anthro-
pologist, Keith Basso, on the necessity of putting linguistic taxonomies in the 
context of cultural rules, which used the ice terminology of the Fort Norman Slave 
Indians, an Athapaskan speaking group on the MacKenzie River in Canada's 
North-West Territories, showed me another "truth" about the delineation of 
nature. The Fort Norman Slave hunter has thirteen categories of ice, but 
knowledge of this terminology to predict whether he will cross the ice or detour 
is useless until you understand the morphological attributes of each of the thirteen 
kinds of ice—thickness, color, air pockets, texture, etc.—and know whether the 
hunter is traveling by foot, snowshoes, or dogsled (Basso 1972). The environ-
mental context as understood through cultural norms determines the behavioral 
response. Knowledge of all of these allows an observer to predict the hunter's 
specific action. Studying American taxonomies of snow, the criteria on which 
they are based, and the contexts in which they are used ought, I believe, to yield 
similar results. 
The second most frequently asked question of the historian of snow is, "are 
any two snowflakes ever alike?" This question makes no more sense than if 
"humans" were substituted for "snowflakes." As in all questions of quiddity, the 
answer depends on the degree of difference sought. The more interesting 
question is why we like to think that no two are alike. The Vermont farmer W. 
A. Bentley took thousands of micro-photographs of snow crystals between 1884 
and 1931 and when he published a selection he made sure they were all different. 
In the same years, however, meteorologists began to classify all falling snow into 
seven basic types and later reduced these to five. Skiers have created dozens of 
names for snow—powder, corn snow, ball bearings, kitty litter, and crud 
(Mergen, 1992,87). The morphological attributes used to define these types may 
be similar to those used in the snow sciences, but the cultural contexts in which 
the terms are used are different. A ski area manager will use the term "packed 
powder" to describe conditions because it sounds better than "harbor chop," and 
will avoid the term "slush" at all costs. 
Thus, we have two examples in which it is possible to say with some certainty 
that there are right and wrong answers to the questions "do Eskimos have x 
number of words for snow?" and "are any two snowflakes alike?" The answer 
to the first question requires elaboration of its meaning by hypotheses about 
linguistic terms and about the relation of taxonomies to behavior, but it is possible 
to say "truthfully," no, Eskimos do not have x number of words for snow, and, 
moreover, the words only make sense in the context of cultural rules for acting on 
the knowledge of the environmental reality that the words approximate. An 
Eskimo, an anthropologist, and an historian tell the truth if they select the word(s) 
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which best describe the specific physical and cultural situation they seek to 
explain and their explanations are confirmed by repeated observations of similar 
situations. 
Similarly, the answer to the second frequently asked question is an unequivo-
cal, no, if by "alike" we mean identical in every detail, since every atom has a 
unique origin. On the other hand, an historian may hypothesize certain similari-
ties among snow flakes (or storms) and truthfully predict environmental and 
cultural responses. 
Early in my research I had the good fortune to contact Sam Colbeck, a 
geophysicist with the Snow and Ice Branch, Research Division, U.S. Army Cold 
Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL) in Hanover, New 
Hampshire. Sam is one of the world's foremost authorities on snow metamor-
phism, chair of the Working Group on Snow Classification of The International 
Commission on Snow and Ice of the International Association of Scientific 
Hydrology, and a historian of the snow sciences. What I learned from Sam is that 
after a century of research on snow-cover, there is still no general agreement 
among meteorologists, hydrologists, chemists, and physicists as to what snow is 
or how to explain the behavior of snow-cover under various conditions. Although 
snow science has moved beyond the purely descriptive stage, current models are 
unable to predict the results of snow metamorphism in a wide variety of snow 
types. This has not, however, prevented engineers from accurately predicting the 
spring run-off from the melting snowpack or building safe runways for large 
aircraft to land and take-off on snow. Colbeck argues that "the success of current 
efforts will be determined in part by our ability to characterize snow as an 
assembly of particles" (Colbeck 1987, 64). The most recent classification of 
snow grains based on morphology lists thirty-three subclasses and a process-
oriented classification allows for the description of hundreds of other snow types 
(Colbeck 1990). Students of snow and of human behavior have at least two things 
in common: newer and better instruments provide more and more detailed 
information about their subjects and the objects of their study keep changing. 
The existence of truth requires the individual historian to relinquish his/her 
authority and remain unsatisfied with social constructions, a position as untenable 
to elitists as it is to pluralists, relativists and narrativists. Truth, determined by the 
best possible hypothesis based on the best available evidence, is not just as good 
as some other hypothesis, it is better. Reasonable persons can disagree, but they 
must be willing to revise their beliefs in the face of theories that are repeatedly 
confirmed with different methods by different investigators at different times. 
Revision is not the same as relativism, in fact it is incompatible with a pure 
relativism that seeks refuge in agnosticism. The outpouring of historical 
monographs in the past fifty years has resulted in our knowing more and more 
about less and less. The dream of every man his own historian has become a 
nightmare, but, in Murray ' s eloquent argument: "once it is accepted that concepts, 
desires, intentions, and so forth are legitimate scientific constructs in terms of 
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which behavior can be explained, it becomes possible to approach problems such 
as meaning and reference in ways that do not warrant the skeptical results lately 
so popular" (Murphey, 324). 
In his brilliant essay on poetry and history, the Mexican poet Octavio Paz 
argues that "like all human creations, the poem is a historical product, fruit of a 
time and a place; but it is also something that transcends the historical and is 
situated in a time prior to all history, at the beginning of the beginning" ( 169). Paz 
calls this "archetypal reality;" Murray calls it truth, the reality of past events. The 
historian and the poet both use words to go beyond words, to discover the things 
that give meaning to human "concepts, desires, and intentions." Paz offers a 
further insight relevant to the problem of establishing truth in history. 
If the essence of history were nothing but the succession of one 
instant by another, one man by another, one civilization by 
another, change would be resolved to uniformity, and history 
would be nature. Indeed, whatever their specific differences 
may be, one pine tree is the same as another pine tree. But the 
opposite occurs with history: whatever their common charac-
teristics may be, one man is irreducible to another man, one 
historical instant to another instant. And what makes the 
instant an instant, time time, is man, who fuses them to make 
them unique and absolute. History is exploit, heroic act, 
conglomeration of meaningful instants because man makes of 
each instant something self-sufficient and thus separates the 
today from the yesterday. In each instant he wishes to realize 
himself as a totality, and each one of his hours is a monument 
to a momentary eternity.... He creates a unique and unrepeatable 
instant and thus gives origin to history (172-173). 
I would say more than I mean if I claimed that poetry and history are the same, 
but both require a theory of truth and the ability to behold the "Nothing that is not 
there and the nothing that is," to borrow a line from Wallace Stevens' "The Snow 
Man." For me, the attraction of American Studies is the possibility that history 
is both science and art. 
Ontological truth does not change because epistemologies differ or are 
revised. One of the wisest observations I found in my research was made by the 
great British meteorologist Sir Napier Shaw. In writing the history of the science 
of weather, he remarked that the theories of the early eighteenthth-century natural 
philosopher George Hadley on trade-winds "belong to the fairy tales of science 
because they explain the complexity of nature by a simplicity which is suggestive 
of a fairy ' s wand." But, Shaw continues, "They are none the less attractive on that 
account. Every theory of the course of events in nature is necessarily based on 
some process of simplification of the phenomena and is to some extent therefore 
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a fairy tale" (Shaw, 1926, vol. 1, 123). As in nature, so in culture. Our theories 
of historical facts and our explanations of the past may be simplifications, but 
experience of the world we live in leaves no question that they can be true or false. 
If we believe that history is anything more than entertainment, or "edu-tainment" 
as the Disney "imagineers" put it, then we believe in a theory of truth. A theory, 
which like other fairy tales, however improbable, reveals a (snow) particle of 
truth. 
Murray Murphey challenges historians to recover the "noble dream" of 
establishing the truth of their observations through the use of theory and by 
formulating general theories of causality. Without that dream, the belief in truth, 
the past is trivialized and the future terrifyingly chaotic. 
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